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ABSTRACT
Just prior to and following Abraham Lincoln's election 
to the Presidency on November 6/ 1860, the United States was 
on the verge of dividing into two separate nations. Many 
Southerners were threatening secession in the event of 
Lincoln's election, fearing that if a Republican occupied 
the White House the existence of slavery and slavery's 
expansion into the western territories, in particular, would 
be endangered. In the months following Lincoln's election, 
American newspapers and the general populace clamored for 
Lincoln to speak or act in a manner that would stem the 
secession crisis and avert the horror of civil war. While 
some historians in the past have claimed that Lincoln did 
not anticipate civil war and failed to take secession 
threats seriously, Lincoln could not fail to be affected by 
public opinion. Nevertheless, he was unwilling to 
compromise on the issue of westward slavery expansion and 
was also unwilling to permit Southern states to secede 
unopposed. Consequently, he further aggravated Southern 
hostility to the North and the Republican party, 
specifically. But Lincoln was reluctant to accept sole 
responsibility for the secession crisis and the possibility 
of civil war, fearful of losing the public support he so 
desperately required in order to maintain federal authority 
throughout the country, even in the South. As newspapers and 
citizens accused Lincoln of inciting secession and provoking 
civil war, Lincoln counterattacked first with a policy of 
dignified silence and finally with potent rhetoric that 
emphasized that he was responsible for none of the nation's 
difficulties. He was but the servant and representative of 
the American people, not their leader; he performed their 
will, not his own. In this way, Lincoln endeavored to 
absolve himself of the responsibility for any armed conflict 
which might ensue and also maintained the much needed 
popular support of the Northern public.
"I CLAIM NOT TO HAVE CONTROLLED EVENTS": 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE MANIPULATION 
OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE SECESSION CRISIS
In August of 1858, Abraham Lincoln wrote,
In this age, and this country, public sentiment is every 
thing. With it, nothing can fail; against it, nothing 
can succeed. Whoever moulds public sentiment, goes 
deeper than he who enacts statutes, or pronounces 
judicial decisions. He makes possible the enforcement of 
these, else impossible.^
Little did Lincoln realize, during the summer of 1858, how 
influential public opinion would become in his political 
life, particularly during the critical winter months of the 
secession crisis, and how he would be compelled not only to 
mold it in his favor, but to ensure that he himself did not 
outrun public sentiment in the pronouncement and 
implementation of his political policies. During the winter 
of 1860-61, Lincoln occupied the precarious position of 
President-elect while the United States was rapidly dividing 
along sectional lines. Many Southern Democrats were 
demanding constitutional protection of slavery and its 
expansion and threatening to withdraw from the Union should 
a Republican be elected to or be allowed to assume the 
American Presidency. Most Republicans and Northern Democrats 
were attempting to stem the crisis both through efforts at 
conciliation and through postures of aggression. Throughout 
this period, President-elect Lincoln endeavored to remain
^■Roy P. Basler, e d . , The Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N J : Rutgers University 
Press, 1953), 2:352-3.
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3above the fray, but with the constant public outcry for his 
views and the worsening of the sectional crisis, it was 
difficult for Lincoln to remain silent and inwardly 
composed.
After all, much of the crisis during that winter 
revolved around Lincoln's election to the Presidency. While 
running for the Senate in 1858, Lincoln had publicly 
proclaimed, in words now immortalized,
"A house divided against itself cannot stand."
I believe this government cannot endure permanently 
half slave and half free.^
Southern fire-eaters grasped at these words and others like 
them in an effort to prove that Lincoln was not only anti­
slavery in sentiment, but that he would make war upon the 
South in an effort to eradicate the "peculiar institution." 
Fearful of the safety of their livelihoods and domestic 
institutions, many Southern politicians threatened secession 
should Lincoln, or any Republican, occupy the White House. 
Under such circumstances and with constant pressure from 
newspapers, friends, and citizens, Lincoln felt an 
enormous responsibility weighing on him both as President­
elect and later as President. With him lay the burden of
^Ibid., 2:461-2.
4preserving the federal Union and the Republican party, as 
well as his own political reputation. As a result, Lincoln 
publicly endeavored to shift the responsibility for the 
secession crisis and any impending physical confrontation 
between North and South from his own shoulders to those of 
hothead Southerners and the American people as a whole. By 
so doing, he was able to assume, during the winter’ months of 
1860-61, an often uncompromising posture toward the South 
while still appearing, at least publicly, to be patiently 
performing the will of the electorate.
Lincoln's behavior during the winter of 1860-61 has 
been pondered and analyzed by historians for decades. While 
most historians agree that Lincoln's election to the 
Presidency precipitated the spread of secessionist sentiment 
throughout the South, their opinions as to Lincoln's 
perception of the crisis and the motivating factors behind 
his reactions to it vary widely. David Potter and, more 
recently, Robert Bruce both claim that Lincoln failed to see 
the possibility of civil war erupting between North and 
South and severely underestimated the Southern secessionist 
temper. Under this interpretation, most of Lincoln's public 
pronouncements must be taken at face value. According to 
Potter and Bruce, when Lincoln declared he expected no 
bloodshed, he meant it. Conversely, other historians of
5more extreme bent, such as Ludwell Johnson and George 
Forgie, assert that Lincoln expected war and even initiated 
it. In Johnson's view, Lincoln planned the Fort Sumter 
crisis, hoping that Southerners would fire on the federal 
stronghold, thus absolving the North of any blame for 
beginning a conflict and ensuring that the Northern public 
would unite and arm themselves against the aggressive 
Confederacy. In a less extravagant but certainly not less 
radical vein, Forgie argues that Lincoln inaugurated war 
between North and South in an unconscious effort to provide 
himself with the opportunity of becoming the nation's savior.^ 
Kenneth Stampp and Richard Current believe that Lincoln 
saw in the Fort Sumter crisis an avenue by which he could 
test federal authority in the South and, if it were 
resisted, see the role of aggressor placed on Southern 
hotheads rather than on the federal government. But they do 
not suggest, as Johnson does, that Lincoln planned the Fort 
Sumter crisis. They merely suggest that Lincoln saw in the 
crisis an opportunity to either call the Confederacy's bluff
^See David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848- 
1861, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1976); David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in 
the Secession Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1942); Robert V. Bruce, "The Shadow of a Coming War," in 
Lincoln, the War President: The Gettysburg Lectures, e d . 
Gabor S. Boritt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); 
Ludwell H. Johnson, Division and Reunion: American 1848-1877 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978); George B. Forgie, 
Patricide in the House Divided: A Psychological 
Interpretation of Lincoln and His Age (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1979).
6or have the South, rather than the federal government, 
initiate a conflict. Either way, Lincoln would succeed in 
his ultimate goal— the enforcement of government authority. 
Scholars writing in the decades after Stampp and Current 
agree that Lincoln did indeed expect war, much as he may 
have hoped to avoid it and settle sectional differences 
peaceably. James McPherson, Robert Johannsen, and David 
Donald all claim that Lincoln had an immense faith in 
Southern unionism and, consequently, hoped to avert a 
sectional confrontation by appealing to that unionist 
sentiment. Nevertheless, they point out that Lincoln was 
unwilling to risk the ruin of the Republican Party or the 
destruction of federal authority to appease the South. He 
was prepared to remain firm in his views on slavery and its 
expansion into western territories and was willing to hazard 
civil war should the South fail to rally around the national 
standard.^
While historians like Stampp and Current present a more
4See Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: The North and 
the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1950); Kenneth M. Stampp, "Lincoln 
and the Strategy of Defense in the Crisis of 1861," The 
Journal of Southern History 11 (August 1945): 297-233;
Richard N. Current, Lincoln and the First Shot (Philadelphia: 
J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1963); James M. McPherson, Abraham 
Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of 
Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988); Robert W. Johannsen, Lincoln, the South, and Slavery: 
The Political Dimension (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1991); David Donald, Lincoln (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1995).
7than plausible analysis of Lincoln's motivations during the 
secession crisis, the crux of their arguments focuses mainly 
on the political and military implications of Lincoln's 
actions. Most scholars overlook, or at least downplay, the 
role Lincoln's efforts to shape his own public persona 
played during the crisis. But through a careful analysis 
of Lincoln's public pronouncements and private 
correspondence, as well as through an examination of the 
various media which influenced him, one can gain a more 
profound portrait of Lincoln the man and the politician and 
also understand how public opinion and public figures' 
endeavors to mold it shape history. Through an analysis of 
Lincoln's language during the secession crisis, it becomes 
evident that Lincoln was endeavoring to absolve himself and 
his party of responsibility for the crisis and the 
possibility of civil war. By gradually fashioning public 
sentiment in favor of his often uncompromising policies 
without openly stating what those policies would be,
Lincoln was able to gather enough public support to ensure 
the government's ability to maintain its authority and to 
wage what might otherwise have been an unpopular war.
As a politician far from unanimously elected to the 
American Presidency, Lincoln undoubtedly felt the necessity of 
gathering as much public support as possible between his 
election and inauguration. His election was successful 
largely due to the rupture of the Democratic party. While
8Lincoln received 180 electoral votes and 1,864,735 popular 
votes, 2,821,157 Americans voted against him, and he did not 
receive a single vote in ten Southern states. Many of those 
who did vote for Lincoln did so not because he opposed the 
expansion of slavery, but despite his position on slavery. 
Many voters' support of the Republican ticket was based on 
Lincoln's advocacy of popular issues such as the construction 
of a transcontinental railroad, free homesteads, and a 
protective tariff. Thus, the most controversial issue of 
the campaign--the question of expanding slavery into the 
western territories— was largely irrelevant to Lincoln's 
victory. As a result, while many Southerners proclaimed 
their states would secede from the Union if Lincoln were 
elected, few Americans were inclined to believe such threats 
at first. Southerners had threatened the same in 1856, in 
the event of John C. Fremont's election to the Presidency. 
Nevertheless, three Southern states took legislative action 
to prepare for secession in the event of Lincoln's election 
before his victory was even established, and within a month 
of November 6 and the Republican triumph, every state in the 
lower South had called secession conventions. It seemed 
that, in 1860, Southern advocates of secession were serious. 
But Republicans had nothing to gain by taking secession 
seriously if they wished their candidate to be elected and 
installed in the White House without incident. They did not 
wish the electorate to be frightened into voting for a
9Democratic candidate, nor did they wish to incite Southern 
hotheads to further actions on behalf of disunion by 
displaying any genuine apprehension of secession or 
sectional conflict. Consequently, they patently dismissed
the secession crisis as just one more instance of Southern
c;
bluster.J
But public opinion could not be entirely ignored.
There were Republicans who considered secession a 
genuine menace and openly said so. Horace Greeley, 
Republican editor of the New York Daily Tribune, believed 
secessionists were serious in their threats, but he also 
felt that Lincoln's election was merely an excuse for a 
preconceived plan to withdraw from the Union. Some 
Southerners regarded secessionists in the same light. R.S. 
Donnell, a North Carolina politician, claimed that Southern 
fire-eaters deliberately caused a split in the Democratic 
party,
to insure the election of Mr. Lincoln, and thereby forge 
for themselves a grievance which would seem to justify 
them in the execution of the long-meditated designs of 
destroying the Union.
Charlottesville, Virginia's The Review agreed, observing, 
"The present election is not the cause with South Carolina;
^Potter, Impending Crisis, 431, 442-3; Potter,
Lincoln, 2, 7-8, 189-90, 257; Donald, 256.
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it is merely the o c c a s i o n . L i n c o l n  himself, in his 
Cooper Institute Address in February 1860, poked fun at 
Southerners who were inclined to claim Republican victory as 
an excuse for secession:
But you will not abide the election of a Republican 
President! In that supposed event, you say, you will 
destroy the Union; and then, you say, the great crime of 
having destroyed it will be upon us! That is cool. A 
highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, and mutters through 
his teeth, "Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, and 
then you will be a murderer!"
Yet there were Southerners who actually perceived 
Lincoln's election to the Presidency as a threat to their 
section of the country, firmly believing he would implement 
aggressive policies harmful to Southern social institutions. 
Henry L. Benning, a Georgia politician, proposed, "The 
election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency of the United
c
Horace Greeley, Recollections of a Busy Life:
Including Reminiscences of American Politics and 
Politicians, From the Opening of the Missouri Contest to the 
Downfall of Slavery (New York: J.B. Ford & Company, 1868), 
394; Daily Tribune (New York), 12 November 1860; R.S. 
Donnell, A Voice From North Carolina--the Secessionists: 
Their Promises and Performances; The Condition into Which 
They Have Brought the Country; The Remedy, Etc. (New York: 
Anson D.F. Randolph, 1863), 9; Dwight Lowell Dumond,
Southern Editorials on Secession (New York: The Century 
Company, 1932), 263.
^Basler, 3:547.
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States means the abolition of slavery. . . . "  Georgia's 
governor, Joseph E. Brown, asserted that Lincoln's election 
demonstrated an "avowed hostility to our rights" and "does 
in my opinion, afford ample cause to justify the South in 
withdrawing from a confederacy where her equality . . . can
no longer be protected."® Newspapers across the South 
made similar declarations with varying degrees of distemper. 
The Richmond Enquirer asserted that Republicans would gain 
ascendancy over the South through "the use of federal 
office, contracts, power and patronage" and that "in a few 
short years . . . the confiscation of negro property by
emancipation" would result. The New Orleans Daily Bee 
claimed, on December 17, 1860, that Lincoln's election was
"proof of a settled and immutable policy of aggression by 
the North towards the South. . . . "9
Several border state newspapers also expressed 
apprehension over Lincoln's election, though they were less 
concerned with Lincoln's political views than with the 
effect his election would have on advocates of secession.
®Henry L. Benning, "Henry L. Benning's Secessionist 
Speech, Monday Evening, November 19, 1860," in Secession
Debated: Georgia's Showdown in 1860, e d . William W.
Freehling and Craig L. Simpson (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 117; Joseph E. Brown, "Joseph E. Brown's 
Secessionist Public Letter, December 7, 1860, from 
Milledgeville," in Freehling and Simpson, 148.
^Dumond, 141, 337; see also Daily Bee (New Orleans),
28 November 1860; Daily Crescent (New Orleans), 14 December 
1860.
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The Daily Nashville Patriot felt secession due to the 
election of a Republican President unjustifiable but, 
nevertheless, believed that "the attempt would be made" by- 
Southern states in the event of Lincoln's election. George 
D. Prentice, editor of the Louisville, Kentucky, Daily 
Journal, wrote Lincoln on October 26, 1860, professing "the 
strongest confidence in your personal and political 
integrity," though he felt compelled, regardless, to oppose 
"your election because I greatly fear its influence upon the 
peace of the country.
Some Northern papers, particularly those which had 
supported Senator Stephen A. Douglas in the Presidential 
election, blamed Lincoln's election for the secession 
crisis. The Cincinnati Daily Enquirer addressed Lincoln on 
February 10, 1861, noting the "great public gloom and 
distress which have settled upon the country in consequence 
of your election to the Presidency." The Providence Daily 
Post warned, four days after the Presidential election, that 
the nation was "standing on the brink of a fearful 
precipice . " * -1-
-*-^Dumond, 148; The Robert Todd Lincoln Papers of the 
Papers of Abraham Lincoln, 1790-1916, 194 Reels, Library of 
Congress, Reel 9, George D. Prentice to Lincoln, 26 October 
1860.
-^Howard Cecil Perkins, e d ., Northern Editorials on 
Secession, 2 Vols. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 
Inc., 1942), 1:85, 268; see also Daily Post (Providence), 8 
November 1860; Daily Illinois State Register (Springfield), 
28 September 1860.
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Lincoln was certainly aware of the crisis erupting 
around the issue of his election. He read newspapers and 
was in constant correspondence with political friends and 
national politicians, many of whom sent him newspaper 
clippings or forwarded other letters and Congressional news 
involving the secession outbreak. But not all the 
information Lincoln received anticipated crisis in the event 
of his election or inauguration. Alexander Stephens, a 
former Whig and political friend of Lincoln's, who would 
soon become the Confederacy's vice-president, declared 
before the Georgia legislature in November 1860,
I do not anticipate that Mr. Lincoln will do anything to 
jeopard[ize] our safety or security, whatever may be his 
spirit to do it; for he is bound by the constitutional 
checks which are thrown about him, which at this time 
render him powerless to do any great mischief.
Stephens forwarded this speech to Lincoln at the latter's 
request. President James Buchanan, in his annual message to 
Congress on December 3, 1860, declared that there was no 
right of secession under the Constitution and that "the 
election of any one of our fellow-citizens to the office of 
President does not of itself afford just cause for 
dissolving the Union. . . . "  He pleaded with Southern 
fireaters to "wait for some overt and dangerous act on the 
part of the President elect before resorting to such a
14
remedy." With moral support even from his political foes 
and further assurances from newspapers, which blamed 
secession on Southern hotheads and referred to the majority 
of the South as unionist in sentiment, it would be easy for 
a man in Lincoln's position to grow consoled. Even his most 
potent rival for the Presidency, Stephen Douglas, assured 
Southerners that Lincoln could do no harm to Southern social 
institutions without the support of Congress and the
1 o
American people as a whole. ^
Some historians claim that Abraham Lincoln and his 
Republican cohorts were consoled by reports of Southern 
unionism and faith in the Southern capacity for bluster 
without action. Bruce proclaims, "Through the antebellum 
years most Americans, including Abraham Lincoln, would look 
away from the shadow of war until the substance was upon 
t h e m . " ^  And the evidence leading to the conclusions that 
Republicans, particularly Lincoln, were inured to Southern
Alexander H. Stephens, "Alexander H. Stephens's 
Unionist Speech, Wednesday Evening, November 14, 1860," in 
Freehling and Simpson, 56; U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: 
Office of John C. Rives, 1861), append., 1; Perkins, 1:96-7, 
108-9; The Daily Picayune (New Orleans), 8 November 1860;
The Kentucky Statesman (Lexington), 20 November 1860; Robert 
W. Johannsen, e d ., The Letters of Stephen A. Douglas 
(Urbanna: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 500-1.
•^Potter, Lincoln, 9, 47; Potter, Impending Crisis,
516; Robert V. Bruce, "The Shadow of a Coming War," in 
Lincoln, the War President: The Gettysburg Lectures, e d . 
Gabor S. Boritt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
11, 18; Donald, 260; McPherson, Battle C r y , 239.
15
secession threats and never anticipated civil war are ample. 
Horace Greeley, a contemporary observer of and participant 
in the politics of the Civil War era, suggested,
It was not easy for Northern men, especially those who 
had never visited and sojourned at the South, to 
comprehend and realize the wide prevalence and intensity 
of anti-National sentiment and feeling in those 
localities whose social order, industry, and business, 
were entirely based on Slavery.14
Greeley's statement, though made in 1866, is exemplary 
of much popular sentiment at the time. Many newspapers 
referred to secession threats as "an empty sham" induced by 
"hot-headed fanatics." The Daily Pittsburgh Gazette 
declared, on November 14, 1860, that the menace of secession 
had "been the bugaboo of the South for thirty years," an 
avenue by which she could "scare the North into submission." 
The Boston Daily Atlas and Bee believed most Southerners 
were unionists "and laugh to scorn the treason and the 
nonsense of the braggarts and demagogues with whose presence
i c:
and blatant b e l l o w m g s  they are now afflicted."
Native northerners, in private correspondence, 
expressed similar sentiments. Carl Schurz, whom Lincoln
^ H o r a c e  Greeley, The American Conflict: A History of 
the Great Rebellion in the United States of America,
1860-16 6 , 2 vols. (Hartford: O.D. Case & Company, 1866), 
1:430.
^Perkins, 1:65, 88, 91.
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would appoint Minister to Spain, wrote his wife on November 
10, 1860, assuring her there was no reason for alarm in
regard to the secession crisis. With time, he said,
Southern passions would cool. Edward Bates, soon to be 
appointed Lincoln's attorney general, wrote in his diary on 
November 22, 1860, that he believed the secession crisis was 
"all brag and bluster," instigated by those "hoping thus to 
make a better compromise with the timid patriotism of their 
opponents." Charles Francis Adams, Jr., son of the 
Massachusetts Congressman of the same name, remarked, "the 
secession of a State is an event of hardly importance enough 
for a paragraph in a newspaper." And Lincoln's friend 
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois told Congress in March,
after the new Administration goes into operation, and 
the people of the South see, by its acts, that it is 
resolved to maintain its authority, and, at the same 
time, to make no encroachments whatever upon the rights 
of the people of the South, the desire to secede will 
subside.
Lincoln's personal letters reflect similar
■^Joseph Schafer, e d ., Intimate Letters of Carl 
Schurz, 1841-1869, vol. 30, Publications of the State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin, Collections (Madison: State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1928), 232; Howard K.
Beale, ed. The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859-1866, vol. 4, The 
Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1933), 157; Charles Francis Adams, Charles Francis Adams, 
1835-1915: An Autobiography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1916), 70-1; Congressional Globe 36.2, 383.
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attitudes. A Republican supporter wrote him in November 
1860, asserting, "With time & reflection will come peace & 
quiet, & this eternal game of brag will have been squarely 
met & fairly & finally beaten." Another such letter, 
written in December, declared that the talk of secession was 
"only political trickery to intimidate the republicans. . . . "
In fact, most of Lincoln's correspondence during the winter 
of 1860-61 revolved around the system of patronage--letters 
recommending individuals for government office and requests 
for federal appointments. By examining Lincoln's personal 
papers, it is possible to see how some historians might be 
led to believe that he and his fellow party members were 
little troubled by the secession crisis.
Many individuals who were close to Lincoln or who 
observed him on a regular basis believed that he felt no 
anxiety for the nation's future. Though not always the most 
reliable source, Lincoln's law partner, William Herndon, noted,
He apprehended no such grave danger to the Union as the 
mass of people supposed would result from the Southern 
threats, and said he could not in his heart believe 
that the South designed the overthrow of the Government.
Henry Villard, a correspondent for the New York Herald and 
Associated Press, who spent every day observing Lincoln in
^ Lincoln Papers, Reel 10, H. Stanford to Lincoln, 15 
November 1860; Reel 11, Jonas Hoch to Lincoln, 10 December 
1860.
18
Springfield, Illinois, prior to his inauguration, supported 
this view, writing in early 1861, that Lincoln "had not lost 
faith in the preservation of peace between the North and the 
South" and certainly failed to anticipate that his most 
significant Presidential duty would be "the suppression of
1 o
the most determined and sanguinary rebellion. . . . »-LO
Lincoln himself apparently vocalized a belief that there 
would be no serious attempt to destroy the federal Union.
An Ohio journalist who spoke with Lincoln at a Washington 
reception just prior to his inauguration claimed that when 
he asked the President-elect if he believed Southerners 
truly meant to secede from the Union, Lincoln replied 
whimsically, "They won't give up the [federal] offices.
Were it believed that vacant places could be had at the 
North Pole, the road there would be lined with dead 
Virginians." Lincoln wrote to one of his supporters in the 
1860 campaign, remarking, "The people of the South have too 
much of good sense, and good temper, to attempt the ruin of 
the government. . . . "  Even after Lincoln was burned in 
effigy in Pensacola, Florida, Horace Greeley noted in his 
New York Daily Tribune on November 10, 1860, "I am told Mr.
Lincoln considers the feeling at the South to be limited to
i f t .William H. Herndon and Jesse W. Weik, Herndon1s 
Life of Lincoln, ed. Paul M. Angle (Cleveland: Fine Editions 
Press, 1949), 382; Henry Villard, Memoirs of Henry Villard, 
Journalist and Financier, 1835-1900, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin and Company, 1904), 1:146.
19
1 Qa very small number. . . . " x 27 As a result of such
remarks, some historians have claimed that Lincoln -was 
operating under a significant delusion, that he had "a 
complete misunderstanding of the Southern temper, and a 
complete misconception of the extent of the crisis.
But to judge Lincoln's personal perception of the 
secession crisis based on the overt meanings of his public 
statements and private correspondence is inappropriate. 
Lincoln, as most scholars would have to agree, was a 
persuasive and often manipulative communicator, both 
publicly and privately. Like any astute politician, he knew 
that his public pronouncements would be closely monitored by 
the American people during the winter between his election 
and his inauguration. Consequently, he refrained from 
making any public statement of his views during the three 
months immediately following his election. He was fearful 
that any such statement would be perceived as evidence of 
anxiety on his part in regard to the secession crisis. He 
was also well aware of his own vulnerability as a politician 
still lacking an official position and therefore additionally
I Q ,
Don Piatt, Memories of the Men Who Saved the Union 
(New York: Belford, Clarke & Company, 1887), 30; Basler,
4: 95 .
^Potter, Lincoln, 245; Gabor S. Boritt, "'And the 
War Came'? Abraham Lincoln and the Question of Individual 
Responsibility," in Why the Civil War Came, e d . Gabor S. 
Boritt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 16.
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lacking in the ability to enforce his views. As Lincoln 
himself was fond of observing to his friends and 
correspondents, his political views were accessible to 
anyone having the inclination to peruse his former speeches 
or to study the Republican party platform. Any restatement 
of those views might be misconstrued as weakness on 
Lincoln's part or might rob him of the dignity of his 
position.^ x
But Lincoln's silence was misconstrued, just as a 
public statement might have been had he issued one, 
demonstrating the anxiety of the general populace to know 
Lincoln's intentions toward Southern disunionists and also 
showing their quickness to blame the President-elect for the 
crisis and any resulting physical conflict. The Providence 
Daily Post wrote, in April 1861, well after Lincoln's 
inauguration and in response to his continuing silence and 
seeming inactivity, "We are to have civil war, if at all, 
because Abraham Lincoln loves a party better than he does 
his country." The Post accused him of clinging to an 
uncompromising Republican platform rather than working to 
conciliate the South and restore the Union. The paper urged 
him to give public assurance that he would not interfere
^Po t t e r ,  Lincoln, 135; David Herbert Donald, Lincoln
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 259-60; Basler, 4:138.
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? owith the institutions of the South.  ^ Lincoln received 
numerous letters from supporters and political opponents 
alike, encouraging him to make public his political 
intentions. John A. Gilmer, a North Carolina Congressman, 
pressed Lincoln to publicly announce what his policy would 
be as President in regard to the slavery and secession 
questions "which now so seriously distract the country." A 
gentleman from Baltimore, Maryland, urged the same, noting 
that "people are in such a fever as to be almost beyond the 
words of reason." Samuel D. Morgan of Nashville, Tennessee, 
wrote Lincoln, claiming that a public address on his part 
would do much "to avert the impending crisis,--and restore 
our country to its wonted prosperity--peace--and 
contentment. . . . "  Robert S. Benton, a Mississppi native, 
warned Lincoln that the South would undoubtedly secede from 
the Union without an "assurance on your part that we are not 
to be prejudiced in our rights by you and your 
administration.
But many of Lincoln's political friends, despite the 
clamor of the public, were adamant in their view that 
Lincoln should remain silent until his installation as 
President. William Cullen Bryant, editor of the New York 
Evening Post, encouraged Lincoln to refrain from making a
22Perkins, 2:711-2.
22Lincoln Papers, Reel 11, John A. Gilmer to Lincoln,
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public statement, insisting,
Such a declaration would be regarded as a concession to 
your political adversaries. They would consider it as 
something extorted by the violence of their attacks and 
would be encouraged to continue them.
Rodney Adams of Syracuse, New York, wrote Lincoln, "Our 
[Republican] platform is sufficiently explicit" to make a 
public address unnecessary. Another supporter from New York 
believed that "any Explanation as to your public policy 
would be mistaken for weakness & satisfy neither side. . . . 1
Henry Hardy of Washington agreed, urging "masterly 
inactivity" on Lincoln's part, as it would,
never do to let our opponents suppose, with any justice, 
that Weakness is a Republican failing.--Yielding to 
importunity, especially from Southern men, has been the 
bane & disgrace of the last two administrations.
Lincoln decided to follow the advice of his political 
friends and maintain silence during the months following his 
election. Henry Villard, the New York Herald correspondent
10 December 1860; Reel 10, C. DuPont Bird to Lincoln, 8 
November 1860; Reel 10, Samuel D. Morgan to Lincoln, 2 
November 1860; Reel 10, Robert S. Benton to Lincoln, 2 
November 1860.
^4Ibid., Reel 10, William Cullen Bryant to Lincoln,
1 November 1860; Reel 10, Rodney L. Adams to Lincoln, 10
November 1860; Reel 10, H. Stanford to Lincoln, 15 November
1860; Henry Hardy to Richard Yates, 19 November 1860,
enclosed in Yates to Lincoln, 3 December 1860.
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who followed all of the President-elect's daily movements 
during that critical period, observed that whenever Lincoln 
was questioned about his views, he remained noncommittal. 
Villard noted, "He could not be got to say what he would do 
in the face of Southern secession, except that as President 
he should be sworn to maintain the Constitution. . . ."
Lincoln justified this course of silence in a letter to 
former Senator Truman Smith of Connecticut on November 10, 
1860:
I could say nothing which I have not already said, and 
which is in print, and open for the inspection of all.
To press a repetition of this upon those who have 
listened, is useless; to press it upon those who have 
refused to listen, and still refuse, would be wanting in 
self-respect, and would have an appearance of sycophancy 
and timidity, which would invite the contempt of good 
men, and encourage the bad ones to clamor the more 
loudly.25
But Lincoln's silent posture was not greeted cheerfully 
by all of his supporters or by all Republicans. Charles 
Francis Adams, Jr., complained during the winter of 1861, 
"Lincoln's attitude was wholly unknown. His every movement 
was jealously watched; his utterances closely followed."25 
The American press, which constantly endeavored to shape 
public opinion, was even more disturbed by Lincoln's seeming
25Villard, Memoirs, 143-5; Basler, 4: 138.
25Adams, 73-4.
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passivity. George Gordon Bennett, editor of the New York 
Herald, wrote on January 12, 1861,
in the face of . . . alarming developments, what are the
republican party doing to arrest the triumphant march of 
revolution? Nothing whatever, but, on the contrary, 
everything to stimulate it.
He added contemptuously, "Mr. Lincoln and the leaders [of 
the Republican party] are too busy dividing the spoils [of 
office] beforehand to pay much attention to passing events." 
Henry J. Raymond, Republican editor of the New York Times, 
was equally condemnatory, claiming, shortly after Lincoln's 
inauguration, that he could see "no indications of an 
administrative policy adequate to the emergency,--or, indeed, 
any policy beyond that of listless waiting to see what may 
'turn up.'" Horace Greeley of the New York Daily Tribune 
urged, on April 3, 1861, that Lincoln and his seemingly 
quiet and inert administration "let this intolerable
o 7
suspense and uncertainty cease!
With the enormous clatter of the American public and 
the press, Lincoln could not avoid seeing that a national 
crisis was at hand, despite Robert Bruce's assertion that 
the President-elect failed to see "the shadow of a coming
^ Herald (New York), 12 January 1861; Times (New 
York), 3 April 1861; Daily Tribune (New York), 3 April 1861.
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war." Lincoln felt the responsibility resting upon him as 
the man chosen to lead an already divided nation, yet to 
express publicly his anxiety over that responsibility would 
only worsen the crisis, providing his opponents with ample 
ammunition for further disturbing the peace of the country. 
Those who knew and observed Lincoln in a more intimate 
setting saw the strain upon his features and were 
occasionally privy to his confidence. Lincoln disclosed to 
his Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, his feelings after 
learning of his election to the Presidency in the early 
hours of the morning on November 7:
I went home [from the telegraph office], but not to get 
much sleep, for I then felt, as I never had before, the 
responsibility that was upon me. I began at once to 
feel that I needed support,--others to share with me the 
burden: This was on Wednesday morning, and before the 
sun went down I had made up my Cabinet.
Thurlow Weed, editor of the Albany Evening Journal, visited 
Lincoln in December 1860, and he, too, was aware of the 
strain upon the President-elect. He later wrote, "Mr. 
Lincoln, although manifestly gratified with his election, 
foresaw and appreciated the dangers which threatened the 
the safety both of the government and of the Union." He 
further observed that despite "the difficulties which 
surround him," Lincoln's manner was "so cheerful, that he
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always seemed at ease and undisturbed."
While Lincoln may have remained outwardly calm, the 
nation's newspapers would not permit him to forget the 
immense responsibility weighing upon him. They addressed 
him, not as the leader of the Republican Party or the 
advocate of a particular set of policies, but as an individual, 
placing on his shoulders the nation's destiny. The St. Louis 
Daily Missouri Republican urged Lincoln, on November 21,
1860, to advocate repeal of the personal liberty laws in 
Northern states, which allowed citizens to evade enforcement 
of the Fugitive Slave Law, for if he failed to do so, "we 
see nothing but ruin and desolation to the whole country."
The same newspaper pressed him, in January, to make efforts 
to restore national unity, declaring, "You, Mr. Lincoln, 
have it in your power to stop all this disorder and possible 
civil war— Upon you will rest the responsibility if it be 
not done." The Cincinnati Daily Enquirer addressed Lincoln 
in February, proclaiming that he possessed the power "for 
the preservation or destruction of the country, as you may 
see fit to use it." Henry J. Raymond of the New York Times 
proclaimed,
^®John T. Morse, ed., Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), 1:82; Thurlow 
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27
He [Lincoln] is no longer simply a private citizen, but 
is on his way to the assumption of duties and 
responsibilities more grave and momentous than have 
ever before devolved upon any of his predecessors.
In a similar vein, George Gordon Bennett of the New York
Herald wrote, "To Abraham Lincoln now belongs the power of
restoring or destroying the happy relations of peace and
o Q
fraternity between the North and the South. . . .
During the final months of 1860, Lincoln was beset with 
personal letters, urging upon him a recognition of his 
responsibility to the country. Moses Brigham of Chicago, 
Illinois, wrote Lincoln on October 23, "'He who putteth down 
one and setteth up another1 is about to lay a heavy 
responsibility upon you." Several days later, a gentleman 
from Charlottesville, Virginia, pressed Lincoln,
If you shall avert from us & from the country the 
horrors that now threaten us, the calamities of a war 
the parallel of which has never been known in all the 
tide of times, the blessings of our Creator will rest 
upon you. . . .
Carl Schurz told Lincoln, in November, "Yours, dear Sir, is 
the greatest mission that ever fell to the lot of mortal 
man. . . . "  Kentuckians addressed the President-elect in 
December, noting, "It seems to us that you have more in your
^Dumond, 261, 399; Perkins, 1:269; Times (New York), 
13 February 1861; Herald (New York), 8 November 1860.
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power than any one man in the Union." Illinois Congressman 
Elihu B. Washburne wrote his friend, "You will assume the 
reins of the government under the gravest responsibilities 
ever known in our history." And George G. Fogg, a member of 
the Republican National Committee, expressed his belief that 
Lincoln would have to employ "such an exertion of wise 
statesmanship, courage and patriotism as has never yet been 
demanded of an American President or of the American 
people."^
While Lincoln persisted in maintaining his silence on 
all political questions during the first three months 
following his election, he was undoubtedly -affected by the 
opinions of the American public and the belief of many of 
the nation's citizens that the responsibility for the 
country's future prosperity and peace lay with him. It was 
a tremendous burden for one man to assume, and Lincoln, 
despite the wisdom and initiative he would display 
throughout his Presidency, was unwilling to assume that 
responsibility alone. Lincoln had a great deal to risk in 
1861. He was not among the most prominent members of his
•3 o
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party, having never held an office higher than that of a 
United States Congressman until his election to the 
Presidency. He was also the leader of a new political 
party, the lifeblood of which depended on the maintenance of 
anti-slavery policies, policies which naturally provoked 
white Southerners. Yet to disavow these policies, 
particularly opposition to the westward expansion of 
slavery, even to save the Union, would be to ruin his party 
and his personal integrity. Thus, for Lincoln, provocation 
of the Southern temper was unavoidable. When he first broke 
his silence in February 1861, during his twelve-day journey 
to Washington, it was not to present an avowal of his 
purposes as President-elect, but to transfer the weight of 
the present crisis and pending civil war from his own 
shoulders to those of the American people. His words during 
that journey are not the words of a man inured to Southern 
secession threats and unaware of the possibility of a 
physical confrontation between North and South. They are 
the words of a man attuned to the crisis and unwilling to 
confront that crisis alone.
While Lincoln, throughout his political career, had 
always expressed a strong love for the American government 
and its dependence on the will of the American people, his 
public addresses during his journey to Washington are 
replete with references to the wisdom and responsibility of
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the American people and are repetitive in their insistence 
that the people, not the President, are responsible for the 
nation's course. On the first day of his journey, February 
11, 1861, Lincoln addressed a crowd in Indianapolis,
Indiana, where he claimed that "the salvation of this Union" 
rested on the American people. He declared,
In all trying positions in which I shall be placed, and 
doubtless I shall be placed in many trying ones, my 
reliance will be placed upon you and the people of the 
United States--and I wish you to remember now and 
forever, that it is your business, and not mine; that if 
the union of these States, and the liberties of this 
people, shall be lost, it is but little to any one man of 
fifty-two years of age, but a great deal to the thirty 
millions of people who inhabit these United States. . . . ^
This was the first of many instances in which Lincoln 
deflected the interest and the burden of preserving the 
Union from himself to the American public. By noting how 
small an effect the Union's future would have on an aging 
individual like himself, he maintained that any actions he 
took to preserve it would be taken on behalf of the people's 
will, not his own. He thus absolved himself of 
responsibility for his own actions, proclaiming himself not 
the leader of the nation, but its servant and representative.
He repeated this point throughout his journey to 
Washington. He apparently felt the burden of the nation's
^B a sler, 4:193-4.
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peaceful preservation resting almost solely on his 
shoulders, as he seldom referred to the responsibility of 
the federal government as a whole, referring instead only 
to his own duties and obligations as President. In 
Cincinnati, on February 12, he promised Southerners that 
their property and interests would be protected under his 
administration as they always had been previously and that 
if that promise "shall not be made good, be assured, the 
fault shall not be mine." At Steubenville, Ohio, on 
February 14, Lincoln said, "The people have made me by 
electing me, the instrument to carry out" their wishes. And 
in Cleveland, a day later, he remarked, "It is with you, the 
people, to advance the great cause of the Union and the 
constitution, and not with any one man. It rests with you 
alone."32
Despite his constant references to his reliance on the 
people, Lincoln was also sensible, and publicly so, of the 
significance of his position as President. When he 
addressed the legislature in Albany, New York, on February 
18, he observed,
It is true that while I hold myself without mock 
modesty, the humblest of all individuals that have ever 
been elected to the Presidency, I have a more difficult 
task to perform than any of them.
32Ibid., 4:197, 199, 207, 215.
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But he still refused to perform that task -without any 
semblance of public support and, as a result, remarked at 
Newark, New Jersey, on February 21,
With my own ability I cannot succeed, without the 
sustenance of Divine Providence, and of this great, 
free, happy, and intelligent people. Without these I 
cannot hope to succeed; with them I cannot fail.
With such words, Lincoln not only endeavored to involve the 
American public in the preservation of the Union, as his 
language overtly claims, but also endeavored to rally 
popular support for his own actions by giving those actions 
the semblance of being governed by the people's will, not 
his own. He claimed to act not as the nation's aggressive 
leader but as "an humble instrument in the hands of the
*3 "3
Almighty, and of this, his almost chosen people. . .
Sensible of the responsibility weighing upon him and 
desirous of gathering public support about himself, Lincoln 
was unwilling to openly admit any expectation of civil war, 
for to do so would be to risk disillusioning the American 
public. Nevertheless, he perceived the possibility and deftly 
made the public perceive it as well without overtly claiming 
an anticipation of or responsibility for a sectional conflict. 
He said in his reply to Governor Andrew Curtin in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on February 22, "With my consent,
^ I b i d . ,  4:226, 234, 236.
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or without my great displeasure, this country shall never 
witness the shedding of one drop of blood in fraternal 
strife." On the same day, he spoke before the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly:
I do most sincerely hope that we shall have no use for 
them [Pennsylvania troops]— that it will never become 
their duty to shed blood, and most especially never to 
shed fraternal blood. I promise that, (in so far as I 
may have the wisdom to direct,) if so painful a result 
shall in any wise be brought about, it shall be through 
no fault of m i n e . 34
Lincoln openly denied, in these statements, any desire 
or responsibility for a civil conflict. The mere fact that 
denial was necessary indicates that Lincoln not only 
expected war, but expected that he himself would bear the 
blame for it. Having won the Presidential election with 
the understanding that his victory ultimately led to the 
spread of secessionist sentiment, Lincoln could not fail to 
see his own complicity in the creation and perpetuation of 
the crisis, however unintentional that complicity was. 
Consequently, he attempted to absolve himself of 
responsibility for secession and conflict before it would 
become unavoidable, in a situation like the Fort Sumter 
crisis, for blame to be placed on someone.
In addition to disclaiming responsibility for the
34Ibid., 4:243-5.
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secession crisis and the threat of civil war, Lincoln also 
attempted to mitigate the nation's difficulties by asserting 
that no real crisis existed. Through reasoned arguments in 
the public addresses he gave en route to Washington, Lincoln 
endeavored to show his audiences that there was no cause for 
civil war in the prospect of his inauguration to the 
Presidency. Addressing the Ohio legislature on February 13, 
1861, Lincoln admitted that Northerners and Southerners 
"entertain different views upon political questions, but 
nobody is suffering anything." At Steubenville, Ohio, the 
next day, Lincoln declared that Southerners must adhere to 
the rule of the majority, just as they always had previously 
and that to fail in this would be to defy the Constitution. 
"By your Constitution," he told his opponents, "you have 
another chance in four years." At Pittsburgh, Lincoln 
proclaimed, "There is really no crisis except an artificial 
one!" He emphasized further, "There is no crisis, excepting 
such a one as may be gotten up at any time by designing 
politicians." J
Whether or not Lincoln actually believed that secession 
was a battle cry of a Southern minority is impossible to 
determine, but he did feel that secession and war were 
possible, whether instigated by an elite minority or not. 
Otherwise, he would not have felt the need to challenge and
35Ibid., 4:204, 207, 211.
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ultimately undermine the secessionist argument as he did in 
Cleveland on February 15, proclaiming,
In all parts of the nation there are differences of 
opinion and politics. There are differences even here. 
You did not all vote for the person who now addresses 
you. What is happening now will not hurt those who are 
further away from here. Have they not all their rights 
now as they ever have had? Do they not have their 
slaves returned now as ever? Have they not the same 
constitution that they have lived under for seventy odd 
years? Have they not a position as citizens of this 
common country, and have we any power to change that 
position. What then is the matter with them? Why all 
this excitement? Why all these complaints? As I said 
before, this crisis is all artificial. It has no 
foundation in facts.
Through a battery of rhetorical questions, Lincoln showed 
the secessionists' reactions to his election and prospective 
inauguration to be unreasonable while also maintaining his 
own innocence of having performed any truly provocative act 
toward Southerners. By formulating his argument through 
questions addressed to the audience rather than through 
declarative statements, Lincoln did not so much assert 
himself as he led his audience to adopt the views suggested 
by his inquiries. If the audience conceded, as Lincoln 
encouraged but did not compel them to do, that Southern 
rights were not being violated or even threatened, then 
Southern fire-eaters had no justification for secession. 
Consequently, if they persisted in their disunion plot, they
36Ibid., 4:215-6.
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did so of their own stubborn will, not as a result of 
Lincoln's or the federal government's hostility toward them.
But the crisis, despite what Lincoln perceived to be 
its irrational provocation, was real, and Lincoln took it 
seriously, often acting in a way that contradicted his public 
statements. When informed that a group of secessionist 
conspirators planned to assassinate him as he passed through 
Baltimore on his way to Washington, Lincoln was disturbed 
enough to agree, at his friends' urgings, to take a secret 
train through the Maryland city on February 23. Apparently, 
Lincoln and his companions felt secessionists were firm 
enough in their views to attempt assassination. Lincoln 
knew he would risk ridicule for the secret train ride, and, 
within a short time, the newspapers, particularly Southern 
ones, had grabbed up the story as proof of the President­
elect's fearfulness and impotency. Jokes and songs such as 
"The Lincoln Doodle" were rampant in Southern papers, as 
demonstrative of Lincoln's fear of the secessionists.
Lincoln came to regret the incident for the damage it 
incurred on his reputation. Instead of appearing as a firm 
and potent statesman, Lincoln seemed pathetic and effeminate
in his endeavors to escape an assassination plot which many
37of his contemporaries felt to be a sham.
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But despite Lincoln's apparent apprehension of Southern 
extremists, he was unwilling to be as ineffective as his 
predecessor, James Buchanan. Nevertheless, Lincoln did not 
desire war, much as he may have been accused of initiating 
it. He did attempt in various and generally covert ways to 
temper disssatisfied Southerners and inspire their unionism. 
Though he never bowed to the pressure to make a public 
statement of his political views prior to his journey to 
Washington, he did insert two paragraphs into a speech given 
by his friend Senator Lyman Trumbull. Lincoln attempted to 
be firm in his views, yet conciliatory to the Southern 
temper. Trumbull delivered the address on November 20, 1860, 
stating, in Lincoln's words,
I have labored in, and for, the Republican organization 
with entire confidence that whenever it shall be in my 
power, each and all of the States will be left in as 
complete control of their own affairs respectively, and 
at as perfect liberty to choose, and employ, their own 
means of protecting property, and preserving peace and 
order within their respective limits, as they have ever 
been under any administration. Those who have voted for 
Mr. Lincoln have expected, and still expect this. . . .
The speech was not well received, but neither were any of 
Lincoln's other efforts at conciliation. During the
Hitherto Not Made Public (Hartford, CT: M.A. Winter & Hatch, 
1883; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 
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secession winter, the Senate formed a Committee of Thirteen 
and the House, a Committee of Thirty-three, each of which was 
to review compromises in an effort to settle the slavery 
questions, particularly that of slavery's expansion 
westward, and thus settle the secession crisis. Lincoln 
composed three resolutions to he introduced by Senator 
William Seward of New York, a member of the Committee of 
Thirteen, in which he called for enforcement of the Fugitive 
Slave Law, repeal of all state laws in conflict with it, and 
the preservation of the Union. Thinking the resolutions too 
controversial, Seward and his colleagues refrained from
O Q
introducing them.
Lincoln made further efforts at conciliation in his 
First Inaugural Address, largely at the urging of Seward, 
now his Secretary of State appointee, who found Lincoln's 
original draft far too militant. First, Lincoln attempted 
to reason with wayward Southerners, observing,
If a minority . . .will secede rather than acquiesce,
they make a precedent which, in turn, will divide and 
ruin them; for a minority of their own will secede from 
them, whenever a majority refuse to be controlled by 
such minority.
He continued, "Plainly, the central idea of secession, is
■^Basler, 4:14; Potter, Lincoln, 90-1, 105; Mario R. 
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the essence of anarchy." He further stated that the federal 
government would refrain from forcing Republican appointees 
into Southern federal offices, that he would seek to hold 
only the Southern forts currently in federal possession, and 
that he would continue the federal mails. He noted how 
commerce would be disrupted by secession, asking, "Can 
aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws?" 
Lincoln closed with a paragraph proposed by Seward but 
masterfully rewritten by himself, for the first time 
referring to the South not as "they," but including them as 
"we." He declared,
We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be 
enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not 
break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of 
memory, stretching from every living heart and 
hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell 
the chorus of the Union; when again touched, as surely 
they will be, by the better angels of our n a t u r e . ^
Some newspapers, mostly Northern ones, received 
Lincoln's Inaugural Address with favor, perceiving it as a 
message of peace and compromise. The Jersey City American 
Standard remarked on the day following the inauguration,
we think it was hardly poss 
with more mildness and less 
his inaugural. And if what 
his duty to maintain and de
ible for Mr. Lincoln to speak 
decision than he has done in 
he has said in reference to 
fend the Union had been
^Basler, 4:267-71.
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uttered by any other than a Republican President . 
it would fail to excite any alarm.
And, remarkably, a few Southern unionist papers expressed 
similar views. Raleigh's North Carolina Standard said of 
the address, jys not a^ war message. . . .  It is not
unfriendly to the South. It deprecates war, and bloodshed, 
and pleads for the Union." Brownlow's Knoxville Whig 
agreed, proclaiming on March 9,
We endorse the entire Address, as one of the best papers
of the kind we have seen and we commend it for its
temperance and conservatism. It is peace-loving and
conservative in its recommendations and eminently firm
40m  its nationality of sentiment.
Despite these commendations, Lincoln's attitude toward 
the South was, for the most part, far from conciliatory and 
unavoidably hazardous to the maintenance of national peace. 
Lincoln was willing to see personal liberty laws in the 
North repealed if they were found to be in conflict with the 
Fugitive Slave Law, and he even entertained the idea of 
allowing slavery into the New Mexico territory, knowing well 
that the region's climate and situation would never support 
the institution. But he did not favor compromise on the most 
vital issues, namely the question of extending slavery into
4®Perkins, 2:626; Dumond, 478-9; Brownlow's Knoxville 
W h i g , 9 March 1861.
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western territories that would support it and the perpetual 
protection of slavery where it did exist through a 
Constitutional amendment. As David Potter observes, by 
endeavoring to avoid compromise, "He did not move as the 
champion of democracy, but as a partisan leader." This is 
not to say Lincoln failed to work for the best interests of 
the country, for, undoubtedly, he felt the Republican platform 
expressed the country's best interests. But, as Kenneth Stampp 
points out, Lincoln remained hostile to compromise because he 
feared destroying the platform upon which the Republican party 
had been founded, a platform particularly reflective of his 
own personal ideals, and did not wish to ruin the prestige of 
his own administration.^
Yet by assuming a militant stance against concession to 
the South through his failure to support Congressional 
compromise or to offer any serious compromises himself,
Lincoln risked censure not only from Southerners, but from 
Northern Democrats and peace-loving Republicans as well.
The Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, a Democratic newspaper, 
addressed Lincoln on February 10, 1861,
if you stand out against compromise, you will fill a
^ D o n a l d ,  269; Potter, Lincoln, 200; Kenneth M.
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most dark and unenviable place in American annals, and 
it will be universally admitted that you have inflicted 
the fatal stab that destroyed the finest Government the 
world ever saw. . . .
On April 12, the Hartford Daily Courant, a paper which had
supported Lincoln's election, claimed that "Public opinion
in the North seems to be gradually settling down in favor of
the recognition of the New Confederacy," adding, "The
thought of a bloody and protracted civil war . . .is
49
abhorrent to all. . . ." Senator Stephen Douglas wrote
some of his supporters that he believed Republicans desired 
and were fomenting disunion in order to obtain a Republican 
majority in the Senate, whereby they could approve all of 
Lincoln's political appointments.
But there were many Republicans who supported Lincoln's 
uncompromising stance. Senator Lyman Trumbull wrote 
Lincoln, on December 9, 1860,
It seems to me that for Republicans to take steps 
towards getting up committees or proposing new 
compromises is an admission that to conduct the 
government on the principles on which we carried the 
election is wrong.
Trumbull later declared before the Senate just prior to 
Lincoln's inauguration, "So far as it can be done: I am for
42Perkins, 1:270, 377.
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executing the laws; and I am for coercion." He explained,
"I am for settling, in the first place, the question whether 
we have a Government before making compromises which leave 
us as powerless as b e f o r e . C a r l  Schurz, another 
Republican who was against secession and anticipated war, 
wrote his wife on February 7, 1861, "Let Lincoln once be 
inaugerrated [sic] and things will look different. Talk will 
end and action begin." Lincoln himself justified his 
uncompromising stance in a letter to Pennsylvania 
Congressman James T. Hale in January 1861, asserting that 
Southerners who threatened disunion,
are either attempting to play upon us, or they are in 
dead earnest. Either way, if we surrender, it is the 
end of us, and of the government. They will repeat the 
experiment ad 1ibiturn. A year will not pass, till we 
shall have to take Cuba as a condition upon which they 
will stay in the U n i o n . ^
Lincoln felt the Union could not be maintained, whether 
secession was successful or not, if its maintenance were 
based on surrendering the Constitutional rights of the 
majority to minority interests. Thus, he was willing to 
risk civil war in his efforts to remain firm, even if he 
would not publicly admit his willingness to accept such a
^ Lincoln Papers, Reel 11, Lyman Trumbull to Lincoln,
9 December 1860; Congressional Globe 36.2, 1382.
^Scha f e r ,  246; Basler, 4:172.
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hazard.
Throughout the winter of 1860-61, Lincoln maintained a 
constant correspondence with political friends in Congress, 
urging them to refrain from compromising on the essential 
points of the Republican platform, showing that however much 
he professed to the American public his willingness to 
perform their will, he possessed and intended to implement 
his own agenda. On December 10, 1860, he wrote Trumbull,
Let there be no compromise on the question of extending 
slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and, ere 
long must be done again. . . . Stand firm. The tug has
to come, & better now, than any time hereafter.
He pressed the same words upon Congressman William Kellogg 
of Illinois the following day. While he may not have been 
contemplating war when he made such militant statements, he 
certainly invited the possibility. Two days later, he wrote 
Congressman Elihu B. Washburne, "On that point [opposition 
to slavery extension] hold firm as with a chain of steel." 
Lincoln was even more explicit about his views when writing 
Senator William Seward on February 1, 1861:
I say now, however, as I have all the while said, that 
on the territorial question--that is, the question of 
extending slavery under the national auspices,--I am 
inflexible. I am for no compromise which assists or 
permits the extension of the institution on soil owned 
by the nation.
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Lincoln told New Jersey's General Assembly on February 21, 
"The man does not live who is more devoted to peace than I 
am. None who would do more to preserve it. But it may be 
necessary to put the foot down firmly." After a succession 
of wild cheers from the audience, he continued, once again 
demonstrating his reluctance to assume alone the 
responsibility for secession and war, "And if I do my duty, 
and do right, you will sustain me, will you not?" The crowd
A fl
replied enthusiastically, "Yes, Yes, We will." 0
But Lincoln was not so enthusiastically supported by 
everyone. During the campaign of 1860, neither Lincoln nor 
his supporters campaigned in the South, and he was not even 
on the Presidential ticket in many Southern states. While 
Lincoln, primarily at the urging of William Seward and 
Thurlow Weed, contemplated offering cabinet posts to 
Southerners, including Alexander Stephens of Georgia and 
John Gilmer of North Carolina, his offers or intimations of 
offers were refused, and, perhaps for Lincoln, the refusals 
were not particularly disappointing. His original cabinet 
list, made the day after his election, consisted entirely of 
Northern Republicans. He did appoint Edward Bates of 
Missouri and Montgomery Blair of Maryland to his cabinet, 
but both were border state Republicans and considered by 
many Southerners to be "as bad as Seward and [Salmon P.]
46Basler, 4:149-51, 183, 237.
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Chase." Thurlow Weed suggested, in his autobiography, that
Lincoln refrained from inviting Southerners into his cabinet
because he feared they might prove disloyal if their states 
47seceded. While such may have been the case, Lincoln's 
choice of cabinet officers makes all the more manifest his 
uncompromising stance. All his cabinet members were 
Republicans, and while they came from varying 
backgrounds and often entertained different political views, 
not one of them represented the pro-slavery South or her views. 
Thus, Lincoln was not particularly inclined to include non- 
Republican politicians in his cabinet, regardless of the 
urgings of concession-oriented Republicans and still loyal 
Southerners.
While Lincoln may not have desired war, his actions 
were not always conducive to preventing it, but, as Kenneth 
Stampp points out, he was painstaking in his efforts to 
absolve himself from guilt should a conflict between North and 
South erupt. Lincoln demanded the maintenance of federal 
authority across the whole country, North as well as South, 
and, in so doing,
he calculated the possible necessity of coercion to 
maintain the Union. Whether or not the chance of 
protracted civil war was part of his calculated risk
4^Potter, Impending Crisis, 439; Potter, Lincoln, 
153; Weekly Progress (New Bern, North Carolina), 12 March 
1861; Weed, 611.
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there is no way of knowing. If it were, he was 
doubtless comforted by the belief that the 
responsibility would be upon those who resisted the 
performance of his simple duty as chief executive.
As Stampp further observes, Lincoln's strategy in regard to 
Southern secessionism was one of defense. He promised 
Southerners, "There will be no blood shed unless it be 
forced upon the Government. The Government will not use
A O
force unless force is used against it."
Lincoln undoubtedly expected a conflict of some form
if secessionists persisted in their defiance of federal
authority, as the first draft of his Inaugural Address
attests. In the original, Lincoln closed by addressing the
South, "With y o u , and not with me, is the solemn question of
'Shall it be peace, or a sword?'" Seward later convinced
*
Lincoln to omit this phrase and speak in more conciliatory 
terms, which Lincoln did, but he still proclaimed, in his 
final draft of the Inaugural,
The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, 
and possess the property, and places belonging to the 
government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but 
beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there 
will be no invasion--no using of force against, or 
among the people anywhere.
4^Stampp, And the War C a m e , 187, 190-2; Stampp, 
"Strategy of Defense," 325; Basler, 4:241.
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Lincoln was still making demands on behalf of government 
authority, whether in an effort to preserve the Union with 
federal authority intact or in an effort to justify any 
aggressive measures he might feel compelled to take is 
impossible to judge. But he did remark to Southerners toward 
the close of the address,
In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and 
not in m i n e , is the momentous issue of civil war. The 
government will not assail y o u . You can have no 
conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. You 
have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the 
government, while I shall have the most solemn one to 
"preserve, protect and defend" it.
With these constant emphasized references to "you," "I," and 
"mine," it is evident that Lincoln was shaping his language 
to distinguish between his own obligation to uphold federal 
authority and the responsibility of Southerners to prevent 
civil war by accepting those obligations. He was eager to 
see conflict, if any should result, blamed on disunionists, 
not himself. Lincoln portrayed himself as the government1s 
defender, not its director. In conversation with a New 
Jersey delegate just prior to the inauguration, Lincoln 
further justified the maintenance of federal authority, 
regardless of consequences, saying, "In a choice of evils, 
war may not always be the worst. Still I would do all in my 
power to avert it, except to neglect a Constitutional
49
d u t y . " ^  In light of Lincoln's reverence for the 
Constitution, he undoubtedly felt firm action on the part of 
the federal government to be his sworn duty, but he also 
knew that to fulfill that duty risked an invitation to war.
He knew as well that, as the nation's commander-in-chief, he 
was ultimately answerable for the government's course, 
however much he publicly denied responsibility.
Yet many of Lincoln's supporters anticipated war and 
even welcomed it rather than see the South destroy the Union. 
Indiana's militant governor, Oliver P. Morton, declared, as 
early as November 1860,
Shall we now surrender the nation without a struggle and 
let the Union go with merely a few hard words? Shall we 
encourage faint-hearted traitors to pursue their 
treason, by advising them in advance that it would be 
safe and successful? If it was worth a bloody struggle 
to establish this nation, it is worth one to preserve 
it. . . .
Henry Adams wrote to his brother Charles in January 1861,
If Major [Robert] Anderson [commanding Fort Sumter] and 
his whole command were all murdered in cold blood, it 
would be an excellent thing for the country, much as I 
should regret it on the part of those individuals.
^ Lincoln Papers, Reel 18, draft of Inaugural 
Address, 4 March 1861; Basler, 4: 261, 266, 271; L.E. 
Chittenden, Recollections of President Lincoln and His 
Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1891), 76.
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William T. Sherman, who would become an officer in the
federal army, wrote his wife with less flippancy and more
regret, "In case Lincoln is elected, they say South Carolina
will secede and that the Southern States will not see her
forced back." He concluded, "Secession must result in civil
war, anarchy and ruin to our present form of
sogovernment. . .
Many northern and Republican newspapers anticipated war 
as well and supported Lincoln in his efforts to maintain 
federal authority in the South, no matter the means. The 
Springfield Daily Illinois State Journal, a newspaper often 
believed to be, by many of Lincoln’s contemporaries, the 
President-elect's mouthpiece, declared, on December 20, I860,
Let the secessionists understand it . . . that the
Republican party, that the great North, aided by 
hundreds of thousands of patriotic men in the slave 
States, have determined to preserve the Union peaceably 
if they can, forcibly if they must.
The Columbus Daily Ohio State Journal proclaimed on January 
15, 1861, "The United States Government is assaulted by a
^ W i l l i a m  M. French, Life, Speeches, State Papers and 
Public Services of Gov. Oliver P. Morton (Indianapolis: S.L. 
Marrow & Company, n.d.), 129-30; J.C. Levenson, Ernest 
Samuels, Charles Vandersee, and Viola Hopkins Winner, e d ., 
The Letters of Henry A d ams, 6 vols. (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press, 1982), 1:224; M.A. DeWolfe Howe, ed., Home 
Letters of General Sherman (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1909), 180.
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horde of disunion traitors, and is, or soon will be, 
compelled to act on the defensive, or surrender at 
discretion." The New York Times praised Lincoln's Inaugural 
Address and his intent to "hold, occupy and possess the 
property and places belonging to the Government," insisting 
that it was the duty of the federal government to maintain 
its national authority and that if war resulted, the blame 
must rest with secessionists. Horace Greeley expressed the 
same sentiment in the New York Daily Tribune on March 6, 
observing,
The duty of the head of the Government itself is so 
self-evident a truth that the truth of the corollary is 
no less so--that those will be guilty of commencing 
civil war, if any shall arise, who shall attempt to 
hinder the Federal Government from occupying its own 
property. ^
But public sentiment was not so supportive of Lincoln 
in all portions of the country, and many believed, despite 
Lincoln's own protestations and the protestations of 
partisan newspapers, that if war erupted, Lincoln would be 
its initiator. Senator Thomas Clingman of North Carolina, 
before Congress on December 4, 1860, referred to Lincoln as 
"a dangerous man." He accused the President-elect of 
avowing "the principle that is known as the 'irrepressible
■^Perkins, 1:122, 215; Times (New York), 5 March 
1861; Daily Tribune (New York), 6 March 1861.
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conflict.'" Clingman added, "He declares that it is the 
purpose of the North to make war upon my section until its 
social system has been destroyed. . . . "  Some newspapers 
were equally certain that Lincoln's intention was to incite 
civil war. The Boston Post, a Democratic newspaper, declared 
that if the South refused to acquiesce to Republican terms 
of government, Lincoln and his party "are ready to let loose 
upon her the clamor of civil war and imbue their hands in 
fraternal blood. . . . "  The Louisville Daily Courier 
remarked, "Enough is already known to leave no doubt as to 
Mr. Lincoln's intentions; and Heaven alone can avert war, 
immediately after the 4th of March [inauguration day]," 
and The Detroit Free Press asserted that if a sectional war 
erupted, "let the world be made aware that the 
responsibility therfor [sic] should rest entirely upon the 
shoulders of the republican party." The Nashville Union and 
American called Lincoln's Inaugural Address "a_ declaration 
of war against the seceded states.
Despite these criticisms and criticisms from his own 
party that he was not acting quickly and decisively enough,
^ Congressional Globe 35.2, 3; Perkins, 1:41, 250,
356; Union and American (Nashville), 5 March 1861; Daily 
Dispatch (Richmond), 5 March 1861; Federal Union 
(Milledgeville), 12 March 1861; see also Daily Whig
(Richmond), 6 March 1861; Daily Missouri Republican (St. 
Louis) 14 January 1861; Daily Nashville Patriot, 16 February 
1861; Weekly Progress (New Bern, North Carolina), 5 March 
1861; Enguirer (Richmond), 5 March 1861; Atlas and Argus 
(Albany), 5 March 1861.
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Lincoln, during the first month of his Presidency, was 
constantly evaluating and re-evaluating the secession 
crisis, particularly the controversy surrounding Fort 
Sumter. South Carolinians were demanding that Fort Sumter 
be evacuated, and some Northerners, Democrats and 
Republicans alike, urged the same, hoping thus to avoid the 
outbreak of war. But Lincoln was not so quick to concede to 
Southerners or to follow the popular tide of Northern public 
opinion. When polled in mid-March, most of Lincoln's 
cabinet members, save his postmaster general, Montgomery 
Blair, and his secretary of the treasury, Salmon Chase, 
advocated evacuation of Fort Sumter. But Lincoln was not 
too eager to follow their advice. There is evidence of 
Lincoln's desire to hold the fort as early as March 9, when 
he wrote a letter to General Winfield Scott, bombarding the 
old gentleman with questions as to how long Fort Sumter 
could be held and how and when it might be resupplied or 
reinforced. Though Scott expressed grave doubts as to the 
feasibility of holding the fort, Lincoln was not to be
cr q
easily dissuaded. J
On March 15, Lincoln requested written responses from 
each of his cabinet members as to their opinions on whether 
or not Fort Sumter ought to be held, assuming it militarily 
possible to hold it. Edward Bates, his attorney general, was
^P o t t e r ,  Lincoln, 360; Basler, 4:279.
54
against reinforcement/ not wishing "to do any act, which may 
have the semblance before the world of beginning a civil 
war. . . Seward agreed with Bates, fearing that
resupplying and maintaining the fort would strain the loyalty 
of the border states. Gideon Welles, Simon Cameron, and Caleb 
Smith were also in favor of evacuating the fort, all of them 
apprehensive of war or, at the very least, disillusioning the 
American public. But Salmon Chase and Montgomery Blair both 
believed it was the right and duty of the federal government 
to reinforce Fort Sumter. Blair feared the administration 
would appear weak if it failed to provision the fort and 
would thus incite the rebels to more contentious behavior.
Yet in late March, the situation altered. On March 28, 
the Senate resolved, under the influence of Senator Lyman 
Trumbull, that it was the President's sworn duty to protect 
public property. Lincoln now had the support of a largely 
Republican Congress if he wished to hold Fort Sumter and the 
equally significant Fort Pickens off the Gulf Coast of 
Florida. But on the evening of March 28, General Scott 
recommended to the President that both forts be abandoned. 
Lincoln immediately called his cabinet together and found
^ Lincoln Papers, Reel 18, Edward Bates to Lincoln,
5 March 1861; Reel 18, William Seward to Lincoln, 15 March 
1861; Reel 18, Gideon Welles to Lincoln, 15 March 1861; Reel 
18, Simon Cameron to Lincoln, 16 March 1861; Reel 18, Caleb 
Smith to Lincoln, 16 March 1861; Reel 18, Salmon Chase to 
Lincoln 16 March 1861; Reel 18, Montgomery Blair to Lincoln,
15 March 1861.
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that all, save Seward and Smith, favored resupplying Fort 
Sumter and reinforcing Fort Pickens. Seward's lack of 
support no doubt resulted from his secret promises to 
Southern representatives that Fort Sumter would soon be 
evacuated. Though Lincoln had the support of both his 
cabinet and Congress, his secretaries noted that he slept 
little the night of March 28. Nevertheless, on the 
following day, he announced to his cabinet that both Fort 
Sumter and Fort Pickens would be maintained and
e: c
reinforced.
Lincoln's decision to reinforce Fort Sumter was not an 
intentional step toward war. After all, Lincoln notified 
South Carolina's governor, Francis Pickens, that the fort 
would be relieved with supplies only, not with additional 
troops. By attempting to provision the fort, Lincoln was 
asserting federal authority without giving suitable 
provocation for aggression on the part of Southerners. As 
Lincoln's two private secretaries observed, the President's 
policy was to "send bread to Anderson," for "if the rebels 
fired on that, they would not be able to convince the world 
that he [Lincoln] had begun civil war." When the
^ Potter, Lincoln, 360-1; Allan Nevins, The War for 
the Union, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1959), 54-6; Earl Schenck Miers, e d ., Lincoln Day by Day: A 
Chronology, 3 vols. (Washington: Sesquicentennial 
Commission, 1960), 2:31; John G. Nicolay and John Hay, 
Abraham Lincoln: A History, 10 vols. (New York: The Century 
Company, 1890), 3:394-5.
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Confederates did fire upon Fort Sumter on April 12, they 
were degraded in the eyes of the Northern public not just 
because they "fired on bread" but also because they assaulted 
the fort when they had received word from Major Anderson 
that he would evacuate the fort on April 15, for want of 
supplies. u Consequently, Lincoln was able to assert and 
ultimately preserve federal authority and win the war for 
public sentiment, at least in the North. The blame for the 
conflict's inauguration fell on Southerners, not on the 
federal government and not on Lincoln. The Indianapolis 
Daily Journal remarked on April 11, referring to the 
secessionists, "If the war comes let it fall on the heads of 
those who made it, whose selfish ambition and headlong folly 
would be content with nothing else." The Boston Evening 
Transcript gave Lincoln full support, declaring on April 13,
The usurping authorities at Montgomery have begun a war 
against the United States by bombarding Fort Sumter. . . .
The Government of the United States has now to put forth 
its whole force, and prove itself a government not to be 
defied and outraged with impunity. Every vigorous 
measure it takes to sustain the honor and assert the 
power of the country will meet with the hearty 
cooperation of a loyal and patriotic people.
^ P o t t e r ,  Lincoln, 373; Nicolay and Hay, 4:44; Robert 
M. Thompson and Richard Wainwright, ed., Confidential 
Correspondence of Gustavas Vasa Fox, Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy, 1861-1865, 2 vols. (New York: DeVinne Press, 
1920), 1:34-5.
-^Perkins, 2:706; Evening Transcript (Boston), 13 
April 1861.
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Lincoln was roundly abused in the South for attempting 
to send provisions to Fort Sumter. He was even condemned by 
some Northerners for his action. The Jersey City American 
Standard claimed that the Fort Sumter relief expedition "is 
a mere decoy to draw the first fire from the people of the 
South, which act by the predetermination of the government 
is to be the pretext for letting loose the horrors of war." 
The Richmond Daily Dispatch exaggerated the extent of the 
relief expedition, claiming,
It will be seen that, under the military compulsion of 
the immense fleet and army which the Black Republican 
President has sent to subjugate Charleston, the Carolina 
forces have been forced, in self-defence, to attempt the 
reduction of that fort. . . .
The Atlanta Southern Confederacy declared, "The issue of war 
has been forced upon us." New Orleans' The Daily Picayune 
remarked in reference to the firing upon Fort Sumter, "The 
responsibility for the act, and for all its consequences, 
belongs, beyond a question, to the Government at Washington." 
Even Alexander Stephens, Lincoln's old friend from their 
days as Whig Congressmen, maintained,
He [Lincoln] held that the Federal Government did 
possess the Constitutional Power to maintain the Union 
of States by force, and it was in the maintenance of 
these views, the war was inaugurated by him 8
^8Perkins, 2:707; Daily Dispatch (Richmond), 13 April
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Few contemporary historians will suggest that Lincoln's
decision to relieve Fort Sumter was a ploy on his part to
invite war, while ensuring that the blame lay with
Southerners. Indeed, Orville H. Browning, Lincoln's close
friend and confidant during his White House years, said
that Lincoln "agreed with me that far less evil & bloodshed
would result from an effort to maintain the Union and the
Constitution, than from disruption and the formation of two
5 Qconfederacies." But Lincoln never could have 
anticipated a four-year-long civil war resulting in the 
deaths of over half a million Americans. He certainly would 
not have wanted such a war in 1861. Yet while Lincoln did 
not expect the excessive bloodshed that ultimately resulted 
from the secession crisis, he did anticipate a conflict, as 
his words and actions during the winter of 1860-61 attest. 
Lincoln was determined to maintain the federal union and to 
maintain it without making concessions to the South on the 
question of extending slavery into western territories. He 
was, perhaps, wrong when he told Congress in July 1861, "No 
compromise, by public servants, could, in this case, be a
1861; Southern Confederacy (Atlanta), 14 April 1861; The 
Daily Picayune (New Orleans), 13 April 1861; Alexander H. 
Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the 
States: Its Causes, Character, Conduct and Results, 2 vols 
(Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 1870), 2:34.
^ T h e o d o r e  Calvin Pease and James G. Randall, ed.,
The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning, 2 vols. (Springfield: 
Illinois State Historical Society, 1925), 1:453.
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cure," but he was, no doubt, accurate when he claimed, in 
the same address,
no popular government can long survive a marked 
precedent, that those who carry an election, can only 
save the government from immediate destruction, by 
giving up the main point, upon which the people gave the 
election.
By refusing to compromise and risking the Union's 
destruction, Lincoln ultimately saved it.
But he was unwilling to face responsibility for 
preserving or destroying the Union alone. He needed the 
popular support of the American people in order to implement 
his policies effectively. If war resulted from the test of 
federal authority at Fort Sumter, as it ultimately did, 
Lincoln required public and Congressional backing to sustain 
government authority and to wage war against Southern 
belligerents. But he also needed public approbation of his 
policies to ensure that his generally inflexible stance 
toward secessionists would not be perceived as an 
intentional and unpopular move toward civil war. 
Consequently, he employed skillful rhetoric in his public 
statements, affirming that the people, not the President, 
directed the nation's course and that if civil war resulted, 
the responsibility would lie with Southerners who preferred
60Basler, 4:440.
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conflict to the preservation of federal authority. He 
constantly reiterated to the American public that "The Chief 
Magistrate derives all his authority from the people," thus 
ensuring that his policies would be perceived as popularly 
directed, even if they were not. Through the manipulation 
of language, Lincoln was able to direct public opinion, 
rather than be directed by it. In the instance of the Fort 
Sumter crisis, the people were largely unaware of Lincoln's 
intentions and plans beyond his vague proposal, in his 
inaugural, "to hold, occupy, and possess" federal property, 
and such would be the case through most of his Presidency. A 
majority of the American people did not demand emancipation or 
the enlistment of black soldiers, but Lincoln initiated both 
and did so, professing all the while, "I claim not to have 
controlled events, but confess plainly that events have 
controlled me." This statement, uttered in 1864, 
demonstrated a continuing tendency, on Lincoln's part, to 
project responsibility away from himself and onto someone or 
something else, be it the American people or, as he would 
declare later in his Presidency, a supreme being. To say, 
as Lincoln said in his Second Inaugural Address, that "the 
judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether"
f\ 1was to escape judgment himself. x
61 Ibid., 4:270, 7:282, 8:333.
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